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Abstract
Given the global financial crisis and, particularly, the European sovereign-debt crisis,
European countries have the urgent need to promote output growth. However, due to the
current financial constraints, it is difficult for policy makers to stimulate economic growth
by directly increasing investment. Alternatively, the Governments can promote private in-
vestment, either by reducing the uncertainty and costs, or by subsidizing those investments.
In this paper we try to analyze alternative solutions to promote investment, and hence eco-
nomic growth, under a context of Government austerity. We develop a real options model in
order to study optimal investment decisions, considering both the point of view of firms and
Government. So, we incorporate the Government in the baseline real options model, and we
use this extended model to drive the optimal behavior for firms and Government on their de-
cision to invest and promote investment, respectively. To be more realistic, the model takes
in account, not only inefficiencies (both concerning the implementation and management of
the project), but also the economic benefits of investing, i.e., the investment multiplier effect
in the economy. We also make a sensitivity analysis for the key parameters and define regions
for different types of investment. Alternative solutions are also considered.Among the main
conclusions we find that the probability of being optimal for the Government to subsidize
private investment rather than investing directly is greater the larger the private investment
multiplier effect, the tax rates, the private present value of the profit flows, the private cost
of the investment and, also, the inefficiency level of the Government.
JEL codes: E22; E62; G31; G32; H32.
Keywords: Corporate finance; Fixed investment decisions; Financing policy; Fiscal policy; Real
options.
1 Introduction
The global financial crisis that began in 2007 and most recently the European sovereign-debt
crisis have penalized the economic growth in Europe. After years of easy and accessible credit,
these crises led the European economy to the longest and deepest recession since the 1930s Great
Depression and have increased the financial constraints, both for private and public sectors all
over the world. With the lack of monetary resources and a high uncertainty, the investment of
firms and the consumption of the families have been deferred and, consequently, the economic
recovery has also been delayed. In fact, investment, either public or private, is indispensable to
the economic growth and if there is a private investment reduction, the Keynesian school defends
an increase in the public investment in order to offset the fall in private demand. However, this
perspective overlooks two issues that may be critical: the government budget constraint and
the presence of inefficiencies in public investment that can hinder their beneficial effects (Leeper
et al. 2010).
Actually, on the one hand, governments need to promote economic growth but, on the
other hand, they face severe liquidity constraints and an institutional environment that results
in public investment inefficiencies. Given the budget deficits and debts accumulated over the
years, some governments had to adopt austerity policies in order to promote public finances
sustainability, which are hindering the adoption of measures to promote economic growth. In a
context of few governmental resources, it is necessary to find alternative and profitable solutions
to promote investment. Instead of the traditional public investment, this can be done by ensuring
high levels of political and institutional environments, which means low risk and uncertainty,
and by a policy of public incentives, namely a subsidizing policy. In some circumstances, for
high value or very important projects, public incentives may hasten their implementation. These
alternative policies can represent a smaller financial effort for the Government and can bring the
same payoff or even more than directly investing, which means a higher capital rate of return.
The main goal of this paper is to explore alternative solutions to promote investment, as
we think that it has a crucial role on firms evolution and economic performance. In fact, our
motivation is to find a possible solution to promote economic growth with few Government
resources. In order to do so, we study the interaction between firms and the Government
in the context of investment decisions, taking as baseline a real options approach. The real
options theory insists on the fact that uncertainty generates an option value for waiting, and
tends to lead investors to postpone their investment decisions. Accordingly, we try to obtain
the optimal behaviour both for firms and Government by managing some key parameters to
reduce the critical value and thus to hasten the private investment. Although we know that
immediate exercise of the option to invest may not be optimal for individual projects, we try
to maximize aggregate welfare by promoting that investment. This can be particularly relevant
during economic crisis, when it may be crucial to hasten the investment. By exploring the
interaction between the Government and firms, and the concerns of both, we develop a real
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options model which explores some key factors for decision-making. The outcome is a model
that drives the optimal behaviour for firms and the Government on their decision to invest and
promote investment, respectively. To be more realistic, the model will take in account, not only
inefficiencies (both concerning the implementation and management of the project), but also
the economic benefits of investing, i.e., the investment multiplier effect in the economy. We
also make a sensitivity analysis for the key parameters and define regions for different types of
investment. Alternative solutions are also considered.
Our main contribution to the literature, and also to the policy debate about fiscal stimulus, is
related to the introduction of some macroeconomic aspects into the baseline real options model,
namely the private and public investment multipliers, the efficiency degree of the agents (public
and private) and taxes, in addition to the common aspects such as profit flows, uncertainty, risk-
free rate and the cost of the investment. The model can be useful both for the private sector and
for the policy maker. On the one hand, the private sector will know the conditions of negotiation
with the Government, namely about the maximum subsidy that the policy maker is willing to
give for each type of project. On the other hand, the Government will know the optimal values
for firms and how to optimally stimulate the investment. This paper unfolds as follows. In
section 2 we present a brief literature review. In section 3 we develop the model, presenting the
value-functions and the triggers both for firms and for the Government. The optimal incentives
that prompt investment are derived. The section 4 contains some case-scenario and statics
analysis, and in section 5 we explore some alternative stimuli for investment. Finally, in section
6 we conclude.
2 Literature Review
Traditionally, in the context of investment decisions, the Net Present Value (NPV) is the main
criterion for project selection and valuation. Based on this method, the decision will be to invest
if the NPV is positive. In other words, if the present value of cash flows is greater than the
present value of the costs of the investment, the project should be implemented. This approach
has some limitations because it is suitable for stable and predictable environments.
In the presence of flexibility and uncertainty, the investment decision is different from the
traditional approach. Even when the NPV is positive, firms may delay the projects imple-
mentation. This is because the project implementation is an option, and by investing now the
company loses the option to invest later in the same project. Since the investment cost is mainly
irreversible and considering that firms can wait for more information about the project, it is
important for them to determine the optimal moment to invest.
Then, apart from the NPV, there is an option value for the project, and so, according to the
real options theory1, the total value is named as the value of the investment opportunity. That
1For further details please refer to McDonald and Siegel (1986), Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Trigeorgis
(1996).
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value can be divided in two components: (i) its intrinsic value (the NPV); and, (ii) the time
value (the value of delaying the investment). Total investment value increases with NPV but
the time value component decreases until it disappears. When the value of waiting is null, there
is no reason to postpone the project implementation. When the NPV is positive and the time
value has been depleted, that is the optimal timing to exercise the option to invest. As the profit
flows are unknown, and there is a sunk cost of the investment, we can take advantage of the
flexibility to modify the project and wait until the value of the opportunity of the investment
is optimal. Thus, the NPV underestimates the value of the investment opportunity because it
does not take into account the option of waiting. Accordingly, in our work, we make use of the
real options theory for a better approach, overcoming the limitations of the traditional rules.
According to the real options literature, the optimal timing to invest is highly dependent on
the uncertainty surrounding the project. Everything else kept equal, the higher the uncertainty,
the higher will be the optimal trigger to invest. The economic intuition is that, under (high)
uncertainty, the investor tends to postpone the investment decision, for instance, waiting for
better information about market conditions, instead of investing as soon as the NPV is positive.
Note that this is particularly important in a crisis context, given that a crisis tends to increase
uncertainty, thus increasing the real option value of delaying the investment (Inklaar and Yang
2012).
Lee et al. (2008) studied the value of real options investments under abnormal uncertainty,
specially the case of Korean economic crisis. They show that the more flexible the investment
project is, the more valuable it will be, so flexible projects like R&D accumulates more value
under uncertainty than other investments such as advertising. Other important conclusion is
about the size of firms, which is negatively correlated with the firm value because smaller firms
could be more flexible and give a better response to uncertainty.
So, in order to hasten the investment, the Government should try to reduce uncertainty.
Keeping political and economic stability and reducing institutional uncertainty will lower the
volatility, but normally this is already reached in developed countries2. It is also possible for
the Government to increase the opportunity cost of defer the investment with regulations that
increases firms competition. On the other hand, in the context of the European and Monetary
Union (EMU), the risk-free interest rate is given by European Central Bank (ECB), directly
for the banks and indirectly for companies, so it is not a Government business. Even so, the
existence of other institutions or mechanisms such as the European Investment Bank (EIB) is
in some situations important3.
In addition to try to reduce uncertainty, one of the ways to stimulate the output is by
promoting the investment. The Governments decision on where and when to invest, given the
budget constraint that confines its choices, needs to consider whether the private sector has
2Although the political and economical stability may be achieved, the Government can reduce volatility by
ensuring the number of users or revenues.
3In troubled times, it is common to exist a high difference between the risk-free interest rate for Banks and
for companies.
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an incentive to undertake the project, because without considering the private sectors incentives
correctly, state investments are likely to waste money (Warner 2013). So, the Government should
make a criterious selection of the projects, and also of the policy tools available to guarantee
the implementation of the selected projects, which range from the direct provision by the public
sector to, for example, a partnership or a subsidizing policy. However we must take in account
that even the best projects often does not yield the expected improvement in outcomes. This can
be explained, following Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008), by two factors: (i) public investment can
crowd out private investment, reducing the global impact on output, and thus the investment
multiplier; and, (ii) the ineffectiveness associated to public investment, both at implementation
and management levels.
Since Aschauer (1989b) seminal work on the productivity of public capital, there has been
a growing strand of the literature concerned in measuring the effects of public investment on
aggregate economic activity.4 One key issue in these studies is whether public investment crowds
in or crowds out private investment. Aschauer (1989b) has found a clearly crowding in effect for
the US economy, concluding that public and private investment are complementary. However,
since then, the results in the literature are ambiguous. While empirical studies by Seitz (1994),
Argimon et al. (1997) and, for example, Pereira (2001) also support the existence of a crowding
in effect of private investment, others conclude, either for the crowding out hypothesis (Everhart
and Sumlinski (2001), Voss (2002), Zou (2006), Cavallo and Daude (2011)), or for mixed results
(Afonso and St. Aubyn 2009, 2010).
This ambiguous relationship is usually justified by two opposing forces. On the one hand,
public investment tends to increase the productivity of private factors, including fixed capital
(Aschauer 1989a, Barro 1990). By increasing resources and infrastructures on the economy, costs
for the private sector are reduced. On the other hand, by increasing demand for funds in the
financial markets public investment causes an upward pressure in interest rates, discouraging
private investment (Afonso and St. Aubyn 2009). There may be, also, a credit deviation from
the private to the public sector, thus reducing the available credit for the private sector (Cavallo
and Daude (2011)). Therefore, while productive public investment has a positive and significant
impact on private investment and output, spending resources on unproductive investments could
have a null or even a negative impact on the economy.5
In fact, the impact of the investment on GDP, measured by the multiplier effect, is very
useful to infer about the importance of stimulating the investment implementation. Despite
the necessity of promoting investment, it is not easy to know which of the public or private
investment is better. Erden and Holcombe (2006), considering that investment is important for
economic growth, have studied the connections between public and private investment. They say:
”Overall, the empirical evidence from the US and from developing countries suggests that private
4For comprehensive surveys on this empirical literature see, among others, Romp and De Haan (2007) and
Pereira and Andraz (2010).
5See, for example, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009).
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capital is more productive than public investment, and that although public investment contributes
to the productivity of private capital, it does not explain the major part of the variation in output
growth” (Erden and Holcombe 2006, p.479). Afonso and St. Aubyn (2009, 2010) studied the rates
of return of public and private investment in seventeen countries, fourteen from the European
Union (EU) and also USA, Canada and Japan, for the period 1960-2005. They found that
the effects of impulses to public investment are never statistically significant at the 95 per cent
level, while the impulses to private investment have mostly a positive and significant impact on
output. Furthermore, the output elasticity of private investment is always positive and higher
than the output elasticity of public investment. They also found that the impact of a unitary
increase in investment on GDP is, on average, 0.73 and 1.47, respectively for public investment
and private investment. This means that the private investment multiplier is twice as much of
the public investment multiplier for this sample.
Nevertheless, the economic outcome of public investment is also related with the quality and
(in)efficiency of projects implementation and management. Afonso et al. (2005) shows an inter-
national comparison of public sector efficiency. According to them, ”Most studies conclude that
public spending could be much smaller and more efficient than today. However, for this to hap-
pen, governments should adopt better institutions and should transfer many non-core activities
to the private sector” (Afonso et al. 2005, p.321).
Leeper et al. (2010) emphasized the importance of inefficiencies introduced by some imple-
mentation delays associated with public projects, which can produce small or even negative
effects on output. These delays, related with the speed at which public investment occurs, can
be severe due to the fact that many projects require a strong coordination among several levels
of the public administration (national, regional and local governments), which implies that ev-
ery project implementation ”have to go through a long process of planning, bidding, contracting,
construction, and evaluation” (Leeper et al. 2010, p.1001).
Dabla-Norris et al. (2011) highlighted, among others, some inefficiencies in the public man-
agement process, related with the absence of clear organizational arrangements, regular reporting
and monitoring frameworks, that typically result in chronic under-execution of public investment
budgets, waste and leakage of resources, rent seeking and corruption. Another source of man-
agement inefficiency is derived from the fact that public investment decisions can be influenced
by political economy motives, like the pressure of interest groups, rather than simple economic
efficiency considerations.
Chakraborty and Dabla-Norris (2009) have studied the quality of public investment across
countries, by developing a growth model in order to study how the inefficiency and corruption
of the public investment services affects the productivity of private capital, the specialization
and the economic growth. Synthetically, the paper suggests that the economic growth resulting
from public investment depends critically on the quality and efficiency of public capital. It
also suggests that the quality of public institutions influences GDP more than the differences
of capital across countries. This may represent that the efficiency of the public projects and
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investment is vital for the growth and evolution of the countries. They have also concluded that
weak public institutions decreases the productivity and efficiency of public investment and it
results in a lower rate of return of the private investment, less specialization and thus in lower
economic growth.
Nevertheless, public investment is sometimes crucial for the productivity of private capital
and, consequently, for a good growth performance. Besides the quality of investment, other
factors are also important for the investment decision. Since we look to how the Government can
increase the investment, we have to identify political and economic instruments that fulfill their
own objectives. Keeping political and economic stability and reducing institutional uncertainty
will lower the volatility, but normally this is already reached in developed countries . It is also
possible for the public institution to increase the opportunity cost of defer the investment with
regulations that increases firms competition. On the other hand, in the context of a Monetary
Union in Europe, the risk-free interest rate is given by European Central Bank, directly for
the Banks and indirectly for companies, so it is not a Government business. Even so, the
existence of other institutions or mechanisms such as the European Investment Bank (EIB) is
in some situations important . Finally, we can hasten the investment by decreasing the cost of
the investment. Therefore this is possible by two ways: subsidize directly a percentage of the
investment or indirectly via public investment that reduces the cost of the investment for firms,
and here it is crucial a high quality of the investment to ensure the success of this measure.
All these questions about whether public investment actually stimulates output, lead us
to explore other fiscal policy tools available to guarantee the implementation of the relevant
projects. One of these alternative policies is a private investment subsidizing policy. There is
some literature about the effect of subsidies in the investment decisions. The subsidy reduces
the cost of the investment, and turns the implementation of the project more attractive, by
creating ”a gap between the return as perceived by the private sector and the true return” (Warner
2013, p.15). If the Government increases taxation in order to offset the budget impact of the
subsidy, ensuring an expected zero cost, it may reduce firms profits, but also it may ensure
the implementation of the project, because the ratio between the profits and the cost of the
investment is higher than in the original situation, and ensures the expected rate of return of
the optimal situation. Pennings (2000) showed that the Government can hasten the investment
decisions under uncertainty with a zero expected cost stimulus. Specifically, the author proposes
that a subsidy policy can decrease the trigger value, until it equals the current level of the profit
flows. This means that, from the firms point of view, it will be optimal to invest now, and so
they will hasten the investment. At the same time, with a proper taxation of the profit flows
of the project, the Government can recover the subsidy, and so it is possible a zero expected
cost. Nevertheless, some may criticize the fact that this policy lowers the value of the project
and then the value of the firm. Maoz (2011) has shown this fact, but also that this program
for stimulating the investment, in this conditions, instead of offered, has to be enforced on firm
because of the lost of value. This means that this program penalizes the firms that delay their
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investments.
Although some may criticize that this is not optimal for the individual project because of
the value reduction, we argue that it could be beneficial for both, the firms and the Government.
In fact, even if the project has a lower value now, it can stimulate the economy and increase the
value of other projects, thus generating positive externalities that maximize aggregate welfare
and encouraging the selection of the best projects. Even with this, the firms will take the same
capital rate of return, because there is not only a profits reduction, but also a reduction of the
cost of the investment supported by firms. Therefore, if firms were given the necessary stimuli
and some incentives, they may decide to hasten the investments. The Government will take also
a better condition inasmuch as there is an increase in taxes that will pay the subsidy cost and
could be also an improvement in economic situation.
The value added of this paper is the aggregated analysis, as we consider the perspective of
firms and the perspective of the Government too, by studying public investment in a real options
model. To understand how the Government can improve economic performance, increasing
GDP through investment stimulus is particularly interesting. In the next section we are going
to develop the model and derive the equilibrium.
3 The Model
Consider the existence of a project (or a group of projects) important to the economy. This
project can be implemented either by the private sector or by the public sector. However, as we
saw, the public investment can be less efficient and have a lower impact in the output, so the
Government may have benefits in promoting the private investment. If the optimal investment
trigger for the private companies has not been yet achieved, the Government may have two
alternatives. The first one is to undertake the investment himself, instead of the private sector;
the second one is to modify the investment conditions for the private sector in order to make
the project more attractive, inducing the private sector to undertake investment immediately.
We are going to study the following three alternatives in detail: private investment, public
investment and private investment with public subsidy, analyzing the situations where the alter-
natives are more appropriate. When the immediate implementation is optimal for the private
companies, there is no need for any direct intervention of the Government. However, if this is
not the case, the Government can invest directly in the project or, in alternative, encourage the
private sector to do that. In next sections, we will address the perspectives of both of the sectors
(public and private), determine decision rules and quantify the incentives needed for prompting
the investment decision. We do this by taking into account the (in)efficiencies and the impacts
on the economy that results from each alternative.
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3.1 Firms Motivation
The firms seek for investment projects to create or expand supply, to improve their competitive
situation or also to reduce their production costs. Beyond the position facing the competition
and eventual market share objectives, one of the main benefits of the investment implementation
to the firms relates to the value creation. In fact, firms have interest to find the best investment
projects in order to maximize the benefits extracted from those projects.
The implementation of positive NPV projects brings gains to the firm, but this is not enough
to decide the immediate investment. A good example of this is the current economic conjuncture
in many countries of EU. This happens because the negative economic conjuncture, besides the
great uncertainty about the future evolution and eventual liquidity constraints, make firms
delaying the projects while waiting for more information, with the objective of minimizing the
risk. This highlights the NPV insufficiency in the value determination and the consequent
importance of the timing of the investment decisions for a better evaluation. The real options
approach improves the analysis of this problem, by introducing a new component to the value
determination. In fact, the real options allow to determinate the optimal timing to invest, i.e.,
identifies the trigger value for which is optimal to invest.
In order to analyze companies motivation for investment, we use the real options approach.6
Some key parameters of the model are the volatility of the profit flows (σ), the risk-free interest
rate (r), the cost of defer the investment (δ), the cost of the investment (I) and the present
value of the pre-tax profit flows (V ). We assume that the present value of pre-tax profit flows
(V ) follow a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM):
dV = αV dt+ σV dz (1)
where α is the expect profit flows drift, σ is the expect volatility and dz the increment of the
Wiener process.
The value of the investment opportunity, F (V ), according to the standard contingent claim
analysis must satisfy the following differential equation:
1
2
σ2V 2F ′′(V ) + (r − δ)V F ′(V )− rF (V ) = 0 (2)
The solution for F (V ) must satisfy, also, the following boundary conditions:
F (0) = 0 (3)
F (V ∗) = V ∗ − I (4)
F ′(V ∗) = 1 (5)
where V ∗ represents the optimal investment threshold. The first condition says that the option
6Please refer to Dixit and Pindyck (1994)
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to invest in projects that do not produce profit flows has no value. The second condition results
from the notion that when the investment is optimal, there is no option value to defer. Thus, the
value of the investment opportunity equals to NPV. Finally, the last one is the smooth pasting
condition, that ensures the value function is continuously differentiable along V . The solutions
are as follows:
F (V ) =
(V
∗ −K)
(
V
V ∗
)β
for V < V ∗
V −K for V ≥ V ∗
(6)
where:
β =
1
2
− (r − δ)
σ2
+
√(
r − δ
σ2
− 1
2
)2
+
2r
σ2
> 1
and the optimal trigger for investing is:
V ∗ =
β
β − 1K
This means that the company should only implement the project when the gross project
value is large enough, specifically β/(β − 1) bigger than the cost of the investment. In technical
terms, this happens when the value of the option to defer becomes worthless. Any investment
being undertaken before that is considered suboptimal.
3.2 The inclusion of the Government
The goals of firms are different from those of the Government, but both want to manage efficiently
the resources in order to maximize their own objectives. The firms want to maximize profits
with minimum resources, while the Government has two main objectives: to stabilize economic
cycles and to promote economic growth, also with minimal resources. This means that to achieve
objectives with a neutral or even positive impact in the present value of public deficit and debt.
Generally, the Government can try to stimulate GDP by increasing public consumption, public
investment, or transfers to the private sector, or even by reducing taxes.
Perotti (2004) considers that there is no evidence that public investment shocks are more
effective than other alternatives, but productive investment can have greater impact in some
cases. In fact, in some countries with current account imbalances, a higher available income
can exacerbate the imbalances and have a reduced impact on GDP, while in others it can have
positive effects. In addition, investment decisions are crucial for the evolution and growth of
firms.
Therefore, we are going to study the Government motivation to increase the investment, by
analyzing the interaction between public and private investment in order to find which is better
in an aggregated analysis.
Basically, if we consider a list of projects that can be implemented in some economy, in-
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creasing the investment means to implement some of these projects. However, if for most of
them the optimal has not been achieved, the public authority may intend to hasten some of
those investments in order to improve economic situation. But how can they do it? In order
to increase the aggregated investment, the Government can anticipate some of their projects
to increase the investment now. This can be done, either by directly assuming the investments
(public investment), or by promoting, for instance by subsidizing, the private investment. But is
this efficient? In spite of returning a smaller profit value, the implementation of the investment
opportunity now can bring a positive externality to the economy and improve the value of other
projects too. In fact, both the private sector and the Government can benefit with the existence
of a subsidy. To the private firms, the investment gets optimal, whereas the Government can
promote the economic growth, and increase the collected taxes, and this can be possible without
deteriorating public finances. This leads to a higher performance of the economy, because as
more projects are implemented the better the economic situation and, as a consequence, other
projects increase in value and are implemented sooner as well. Furthermore, it can be expected
an increase in GDP and an unemployment reduction. This can be crucial if the Government
is able to promote the implementation of the most productive projects, which allow the im-
plementation of other type of projects, complementary to these, but more sophisticated. This
represents an evolutionary process, as it potentiates economic growth and economic and social
development. So it is crucial to implement projects with high economic value added.
Instead of being only done by the Public Sector, the investment can also be made by private
firms, which can do it naturally or by hastening the investment decision. In the first case it
is not necessary much attention of the Government, but this is quite different in the second
case. When the projects implemented normally by firms are sufficient, the economy grows
naturally, but when this is not enough there must be some interference. In this case, if the
public institution wants to increase the private investment in the economy, assuming that all
institutional and political incentives are achieved, it implies to reduce the trigger value of the
private investments, namely by subsidizing them. In fact, the firms must have incentives to
implement the investment earlier, but the Government must also take some benefits on than.
In some circumstances the Government may have benefits by investing itself, but in other cases
it would be better to subsidize. Based on the real options model shown previously we are going
to present a model to try to solve this questions.
Including the government, there are new parameters and new conclusions. There will be thus
two trigger values: for government (V ∗g ) and for private firms (V ∗p ). There is also the multiplier
of private investment (λp) and of the public investment (λg), which measures the impact of each
kind of investment in the output. On the other hand, we also consider the existence of two
tax rates: one over capital, the capital income tax rate (tc), and another for the rest of the
economy, the normal average tax rate of the economy (tn). Beyond that we also consider the
comparative inefficiency of public sector facing the private, both in the investment cost (γI),
and in the current value of the profits flows (γV ). This means that we will have two investment
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costs, for private (Ip) and for the Government (Ig), and also two present values of the profit
flows, respectively, Vp and Vg. In this stage we will consider that motivations of V
∗
g and V
∗
p
are similar, because this kind of investment is not a public good. Nevertheless, the payoffs are
different. With a normal private investment the firms payoff will be the after-tax profit flows
net of the investment cost:
Vp(1− tc)− Ip (7)
With this investment, for payoffs for the Government are:
Vptc + tnλpIp (8)
We consider that the benefits of the investment are not only the profit flows, but also all the
positive effects in the economy. With a project implementation, there is a purchase of goods
from others companies, wages for the employers and a panoply of external services and all of
them pay taxes, thus we consider a normal average tax that focus on this indirect effect.
In the case of a public investment the payoffs for the Government are:
Vg(1− tc)− Ig + Vgtc + tnλgIg (9)
or simply:
Vg − Ig + tnλgIg (10)
Notice that the capital income tax rate is a neutral parameter for the Government, when
public investment is undertaken.
The action of the Government reduces the payoff for firms, as a part of the profit flows takes
a form of taxes. However, the public institution in addition to capture taxes directly from the
profit flows of the investment, also receives taxes from the multiplier effect of the investment in
the economy. Since the private investment is usually higher than the public investment multiplier
(as we have seen in section 2, Afonso and St. Aubyn (2009) estimated a private multiplier that
is, on average, twice as large as the public multiplier), it can be better for the Government to
subsidize the private investment instead of directly implement some of the projects.
About the question if the public investment pays for itself, Perotti (2004) argues that there
is no strong evidence on it. However, Pennings (2000) have concluded that the Government
could subsidize private investment with a zero expected cost. Stimulate the private investment
is less costly to the Government (the subsidy is only a part of the investment instead of the total
cost), the multiplier effect in the economy may be higher, the private efficiency may be higher
and it is possible to implement this policy with a zero expected cost to the Government.
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3.3 Performance and Efficiency
Some literature has shown that in some countries the cost of the investment and project man-
aging leaded by the Government are inefficient. As we saw, in the presence of inefficiencies,
public investment may be important only to some extent, that is, to ensure a sufficiently high
productivity of private capital and basic needs. In fact, the institutions weakness and corruption
can exacerbate the decreasing of marginal productivity of the investment and confine it to the
vital functions. In this case, increasing public investment crowds-out private investment and
decreases economic performance. So, as the private one has a predominant role, the Govern-
ment should transfer non-core activities to the private sector. However, if we have a better
efficiency and quality of the public investment it can extends to other areas and increase the
productivity of the economy, so it is a key factor to choose between public and private invest-
ment. Naturally, the decision will be different from country to country as it depends on the
parameters. Accordingly, Chakraborty and Dabla-Norris (2009) consider that due to the po-
litical cycles, clientelism, voting behavior, corruption and mismanagement, in some countries
the cost of the investment for the Government is bigger than the cost of the private investment
and respectively, the present value of the profit flows are smaller. Afonso et al. (2005) estimate
values for two kinds of inefficiencies across countries the public sector performance (PSP), and
the public sector efficiency (PSE) concluding that some countries are less inefficient while others
are more inefficient. Furthermore, we will consider an inefficiency parameter that could be 0 in
some efficient countries or superior in inefficient countries, and we define Vg and Ig as:
Vg = (1− γV )Vp, where: 0 ≤ γV < 1 (11)
Ig = (1 + γI)Ip, where: γI ≥ 0 (12)
where γV represents the percentage of inefficiency of profit flows and γI the percentage of
inefficiency about the cost of investment. On the one hand, the percentage of inefficiency of
profit flows means that the management capacity of the Government is usually worse than the
management capacity of the private sector, thus the Government could have lower profit. On
the other hand, the percentage of inefficiency of the cost of the investment means that the cost
of implementing a project could be higher in the case of the public investment.
For certain levels of Government inefficiency it would be better a subsidy policy. In fact, if the
public projects are not as efficient as the private ones and knowing that the cost of subsidizing
is smaller than the cost of the investment, in some cases would be better the existence of
private investment with Government aid. Under this point of view, the firms can hasten some
of the better projects that have more profitability and more value added, leading to an output
expansion and it is possible that it has a null or even positive impact in the present value of the
public budget account. In this situation, the payoffs for firms are:
Vp(1− tc)− (Ip − s) (13)
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where s is the total amount of subsidy for the project. The payoff for Government is:
Vptc + tnλpIp − s (14)
We resume all the payoffs in the following table:
Payoffs for Firm Payoffs for Government
Private Investment Vp(1− tc)− Ip Vptc + tnλpIp
Private Investment with subidy Vp(1− tc)− (Ip − s) Vptc + tnλpIp − s
Public Investment − Vg − Ig + tnλgIg
Table 1: Payoffs for Firm and Government with and without subsidy.
The trigger value of the profit flows for the firms is given by:
V ∗p =
β
β − 1
Ip − s
1− tc (15)
and for the Government is given by:
V ∗g =
β
β − 1(1− tnλg)Ig (16)
Thus, the value of the investment opportunity for firms is:
F (Vp) =

[
V ∗p (1− tc)− (Ip − s)
]( Vp
V ∗p
)β
for Vp < V
∗
p
Vp(1− tc)− (Ip − s) for Vp ≥ V ∗p
(17)
and for the Government is:
G(Vg) =

(
V ∗g − Ig + tnλgIg
)( Vg
V ∗g
)β
for Vg < V
∗
g
Vg − Ig + tnλgIg for Vg ≥ V ∗g
(18)
After determining the trigger values and the value of the investment opportunity for firms and
for the Government, we can now study equilibrium solutions.
3.4 Equilibrium
In this section, we are going to analyze the interaction between public and private investments.
If it is necessary to promote the investment and if the natural private investment is insufficient,
the Government can increase public investment or stimulate private investment, as we have seen
before. The firms will only hasten the investment if it is optimal to do so and the public authority
13
will only subsidize if it is better than implement public investment. The optimal subsidy for
the firm, sopt, is the amount that turns the trigger value of the profit flows equal to its current
value, V ∗p = Vp:
sopt = Ip − β − 1
β
Vp(1− tc) (19)
which compensates the firm for losing the option to defer the project implementation.
On the other hand, as the Government will only subsidize if this decision is better than or,
at least, equals the public investment decision, the maximum subsidy will be:
smax = tcVp + tn(λpIp − λgIg)− (Vg − Ig) (20)
Consequently the maximum subsidy depends positively on the direct taxes of the private
investment, tcVp, negatively on the direct payoffs of the public investment (Vg − Ip). We will
consider that depends positively also on the difference of indirect taxes, tnλpIp − λgIg, because
the private investment multiplier is usually higher than the public one, λp > λg.
After introducing and explaining some Governments inefficiencies, we will analyze their op-
tions. The Government will only subsidize if the maximum amount they accept to give is higher
than the optimal subsidy for firms:
smax ≥ sopt (21)
If it is inferior, then the public authority will not subsidize, since it will not prompt the
investment for the private sector, and can realize the investment by itself or waiting for a better
moment. Accordingly, there are three types of investment. The first is the normal private
investment with zero subsidies, which has more value; the second is the private investment with
subsidy policy; and the third type is the public investment. Higher volatility, σ, higher cost
of the investment, I, higher risk-free interest rate, r or lower cost of defer the investment, δ,
increases the trigger for which is optimal to invest. This means that when the parameters vary
in this way, ceteris paribus, we go from investment region of type one to investment region of
type two and in some cases to region of type three.
It is easy to understand that in the same circumstances the trigger value for the public
investment, V ∗g , is smaller than that for the private sector, V ∗p , because the Government has
more payoffs coming from the taxes. Nevertheless, with some different parameters it is possible
to obtain a different solution. In fact, the optimal trigger for the public investment is smaller
than the optimal trigger for the private one, V ∗g < V ∗p , when:
tnλg > 1− 1− ψ
(1− tc)(1 + γt) (22)
where ψ = s/Ip, the percentage of subsidy over total investment. This means that the normal
average tax rate in the economy multiplied by the public investment multiplier has to be higher
than one minus the percentage of the investment paid by privates (1− ψ), which is divided by
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the multiplication between the percentage of profit flows owned by privates (1 − tc), and the
level of inefficiency of the public investment (1 + γI).
4 Numerical Example and Comparative Statics
In this section we are going to simulate the model and study the parameters sensitivity . We
consider an investment opportunity with a present value below to the trigger value, so the
optimal decision is to defer the project implementation. The basic case inputs are as follows:
Parameter Value Description
Ip 100 Investment cost for private firm
γI 0.25 Public inefficiency regarding the investment cost
Ig 125 Investment cost for the government
λp 2 Multiplier of private investment
λg 1 Multiplier of public investment
tc 0.25 Capital income tax rate
tn 0.25 Average tax rate on the economy
r 0.05 Risk-free interest rate
δ 0.06 Dividend-yield
σ 0.20 Instantaneous volatility of V
Vp 200 Present value of future cash flows for private investment
γV 0.25 Public inefficiency for running the project
Vg 160 Present value of future cash flows for public investment
Table 2: The base case parameters.
Outputs Value Description
V ∗p 222.22 Optimal trigger for private firm
F (Vp) 51.23 Value of investment opportunity for private firm
V ∗g 156.25 Optimal trigger for public investment
G(Vg) 66.25 Value of investment opportunity for Government
smax 43.75 Maximum subsidy
sopt 10.00 Optimal subsidy
V ∗p with sopt 200.00 Optimal trigger for private firm with subsidy
F (Vp) with sopt 60.00 Value of investment opportunity for private firm with subsidy
Πg 66.25 Payoff for the Government (public investment)
Πgp(s) 90.00 Payoff for the Government (private investment with subsidy)
Table 3: The base case parameters.
With these inputs, the trigger value for the public investment, V ∗g , is nearly 156.25, while
the trigger value for the private investment, V ∗p , is about 222.22. We can see this representation
in Figure 1, below.
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Figure 1: Value of the investment opportunity for Government and firm.
In this example, private firms will not invest until the present value of the profit flows
equals the trigger value, V ∗p . It is possible to decrease this trigger value by managing some key
parameters, as we have seen before. However, even with these parameters the Government can
promote this investment by a subsidy policy. Actually, the public institution intends to put V ∗p
equal to Vp . The optimal subsidy in this case is 10, which is inferior to the maximum subsidy
(that is 43.75). So, with a subsidy percentage of ψ = 10%, the cost of the investment for firms
turns to be 90 and the trigger value V ∗p decreases to 200, as intended. This means that with a
subsidy of 10 the firms will hasten the project implementation and invest now.
On the other hand, the investment can also be implemented by the Government. In this case,
as the percentage of inefficiency is 25% both for the cost of the investment, as for the present
value of the profit flows, Ig is 125 and Vg is 150. The trigger value, V
∗
g , is 156.25, so it is not yet
optimal to invest. Thus, the Government must compare the payoffs to choose the best decision.
The payoff of public investment is 56.25, the direct part results from the difference between Vg
and Ig, which is 25, and the indirect part results from tnλgIg, which is 31.25. Notwithstanding,
the payoff of subsidy policy is 90, resulting from Equation (14). So, in this circumstances will
be better from the public purse and for the economy subsidy the investment, because with fewer
resources the output will be much superior. Considering the payoff for the firm, which is 50,
the total profit flows of the project is 140 with an investment of 100, which compares with a
total payoff of public investment of 56.25 with an investment of 125. This means that in some
circumstances it is better to choose a subsidy policy. Furthermore, the capital rate of return for
the Government of subsidizing is 900%, much higher than invest directly, 45%. This means that
with fewer resources the Government can have the same or even more payoff by subsidizing.
It is obvious that the result depends on the parameters, so we are going to analyze now the
parameters sensitivity.
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4.1 Sensitivity of the percentage of inefficiency
If we consider the same investment with a percentage of inefficiency of 0%, ceteris paribus, V ∗g
decreases to 125, as it is shown in tables Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix. In this situation,
the Government will never subsiding private investment based on budget account, as the optimal
subsidy is higher than the maximum subsidy. Nevertheless, if the private investment multiplier
is superior, the impact on GDP is also higher. With a percentage of inefficiency of 50%, ceteris
paribus, V ∗g changes for 187.5. Thus, in spite of investing the Government will always opt to
subsidize, ensuring that it is profitable for the Government. With these numerical simulations
we can confirm that the inefficiency has a great impact in the value of the public investment
opportunity and in the maximum subsidy that the Government intends to accept. Therefore,
it is crucial for choose between investing and subsidize. The augmenting of the inefficiency
increases V ∗g and decreases the present value of the investment opportunity, which means a
bigger smax. Accordingly, a bigger inefficiency leads to more subsidy policy instead of public
investment.
4.2 Sensitivity of the multipliers
The multipliers have a great impact in the Government parameters. As we can see in Table
A.3 in the Appendix, if there is no indirect impact on GDP (case 1) the trigger value for the
public investment is higher than the base case situation, because there are no additional taxes.
Increasing the public investment multiplier, λg, will reduce V
∗
g and increase the value of the
investment opportunity, so the investment will be implemented earlier. Ceteris paribus, this will
also increase the public investment hypothesis. Contrariwise, increasing the private investment
multiplier, λp, increases the payoff of the Government of subsidize and increases this hypothesis
too.
With an improvement in λg the public investment becomes more favorable and, in other way,
an improvement in λp turns the subsidy policy more propitious. In addition, the multipliers have
no impact on the trigger value of the private investment, V ∗p .
4.3 Sensitivity of tax rates
Assuming that there are no taxes, as in case 1 in Table A.4 in the Appendix, the investment
might be already implemented, because the trigger value for the private investment is below the
present value. In case 2 the investment can be implemented now, as Vp = V
∗
p , but tc must be
16,66%. If tc rises to 25%, V
∗
p changes to 222.22 and it is necessary a subsidy of 10 to invest
now. As we can see in the third part, only this tax rate has impact in the private investment
decision. By the opposite, only tn has impact in the public investment decision. Nevertheless,
both have impact on the subsidize decision.
It is obvious that higher tax rates leads to an increase in the profits of the Government and
it improves their investment conditions. Nevertheless, increasing the capital income tax rate
17
will reduce the payoff for firms, so they will delay the investment execution. This means that
the Government must keep this tax rate in a moderate level.
4.4 Sensitivity of the interest rate
Table A.5 in the Appendix shows the influence of the interest rate in the investment decision.
The interest rate affects almost all outputs. If interest rate passes from 5% to 3%, the firm will
be able to invest now. By the opposite, if it changes to 7% the amount of subsidy necessary for
hasten the investment will duplicate.
Figure 2 below shows, in a descending order, the trigger value of the investment with taxes
(IPtc), without taxes (IP), for the Government (IG), with taxes and a subsidy of 50% (IPstc)
and finally with taxes and a subsidy of 75% (IP0.75stc). As we can see, the rise in interest rate
increases the trigger value for both public and private investment. Thus, there is a delay of the
investment projects, and so public authorities must ensure that the interest rate remains low.
 
IPtc 
IP 
IG 
IPstc 
IP0.75stc 
Figure 2: Evolution of the trigger value by changing the interest rate.
4.5 Sensitivity of the dividend yield
Increasing the dividend yield, δ, represents a higher cost of delay the investment, which means
that the investment will be implemented earlier. In Table A.6 in the Appendix we see that the
reduction of δ to 4% triplicates the amount of subsidy needed for implement the investment
now, sopt, and an increase to 8% allows that the private investment is performed now without
public intervention.
Increasing the cost of delay the investment, δ, also increases the payoff for the Government
of the private investment execution. From δ near to 8% it is not necessary a subsidizing policy
and the maximum payoff for the Government is 100, that is when V ∗p = 200 (without public
intervention). In this case, without any intervention, the public institution obtains the maximum
taxes, so this is an optimal hypothesis. Nevertheless, even with δ = 6% the payoff can reach 90
and a capital rate of return of 900% (the investment is a subsidy of 10). Figure 3 below shows
the relation between the cost of delay the investment, δ, and the trigger value of the investment,
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Vcrit. It is evident that increasing this cost reduces the trigger value for all kind of investments.
This graphic also shows, in a descending order, the trigger value of the investment with taxes
(IPtc), without taxes (IP), for the Government(IG), with taxes and a subsidy of 50% (IPstc),
and finally with taxes and a subsidy of 75% (IP0.75stc).
 
IPtc 
IP 
IG 
IPstc 
IP0.75st
c 
Figure 3: Evolution of the trigger value by changing the dividend yield.
4.6 Sensitivity of the volatility
Testing volatility for 10%, 20% and 30%, we see in Table A.7 in the Appendix that, with other
parameters constant, only for σ = 10% the investment is realized now. In fact, the present value
of the investment is equal to the trigger value only when the volatility is near to 16%.
An increase in the volatility turns the trigger value of the investment higher, which means
that the investment will be implemented later or the subsidy cost to invest now is higher. This
way, the Government should ensure good economic, political and institutional indicators to
minimize the volatility.
Figure 4 below shows exactly the increase of the trigger value of the investment when there is
an increase on the volatility, but mainly it shows that the increase of Vcrit is higher with capital
income tax rate (tc) and lower with subsidy, as we see, respectively, an higher slope on the first
curve and a lower slope on the last curve. This is because, in a descending order, the first curve
(IPtc) shows a situation where firms pay 100% of the cost of the investment and pay taxes too.
The last two curves (IPstc and IP0.75stc) shows a situation where even paying taxes, firms only
pay a part of the investment, because of the subsidizing policy. This way, as the investment
of the firms is only a percentage of the total investment, they support only a part of the risk,
which means a lower trigger value of the investment, because they will invest earlier.
Instead of the subsidizing policy, there is other ways to promote private investment. In the
next section we will explore other solutions.
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Figure 4: Evolution of the trigger value by changing the volatility.
5 Alternative Stimulus
In addition to the cost of the investment, the sensitivity of other parameters is also important,
so the Government must try to optimize all this parameters before introducing a subsidy policy,
in order to use it only when it is crucial.
By testing the parameters sensitivity we can see that the investment can be implemented
now by many ways: if the capital tax is reduced to 16.67%; if the interest rate goes to 3%; if
the dividend yield ups to near 8%; or if the volatility is reduced to about 16%. This means that
instead of using a subsidy policy, the Government can use other solutions.
5.1 Subsidy versus Tax policy
One of the other solutions is the tax policy. Instead of using a subsidy policy, the Government
can change the tax rates. Figure 5 below shows a relation between the tax rate, tc, and the
percentage of subsidy which ensures that the investment is implemented now. As we have seen
before, with a zero subsidy, tc must be nearly 16.67% to ensure the project execution. An
increase in tc turns the investment less desirable, so it is necessary a subsidy policy to encourage
it. Now, we need to understand if to hold the tax rate and to create a subsidy policy make sense
or if it is advantageous manage the tax rate.
Figure 5: Percentage of subsidy for different levels of tax rate.
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As we know that for hasten the investment is necessary a subsidy of 10 or a reduction of the
tax rate to nearly 16,67%, we will compare the payoff for the Government in both cases. Using
Equation (14) we find easily that the payoff of subsidy is 90 and the payoff of the tax reduction
is 83.33.
In fact, it is better to subsidy if the cost or the tax reduction is higher that the optimal
subsidy:
Vp(tc − tcopt) > sopt (23)
where tc is the capital income tax of the economy and tcopt is the capital income tax that
promotes the immediate investment. If this happens it is better a subsidy policy. However,
if the Government have low resources at a given time, implementing a tax reduction for some
projects could be better.
5.2 Subsidy versus interest rate
Beyond the subsidy policy, other variables can influence the timing of the investment too. An
interest rate reduction may influence firms to hasten the investment. Therefore, if there is an
institutional cooperation, instead of the Government implementing a subsidy policy, the Central
Bank can implement an interest rate reduction. Exemplifying, in this case a reduction of the
interest rate to 3% is sufficient to hasten the investment without any other incentive.
Figure 6: Regions for each type of investment by changing the interest rate and volatility.
Figure 6 (left panel) shows a relation between the interest rate, r, and the trigger value of
the private investment, VCrit or V
∗
p . Each region represents one type of investment. The inferior
limit of region B (curve between region B and C) is the curve of the trigger value for the private
investment for each value of the interest rate without taxes and subsidies. The regions above
represents a zero subsidy and an increase in tc, while the regions below represents an increase
in subsidy, which can be reconciled with the existence of the tax rate, tc, if the subsidy rate is
above the tax rate.
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In fact, on region A and B, respectively with and without capital income tax rate, the private
investment can be implemented without any subsidize, provided that the present value equals
the trigger value of the investment opportunity. Thereby, with a tax rate of 25% and a subsidy
rate of 50%, if it is optimal, the firms can invest both on region A and on region B and on
region C. Nevertheless, if the subsidy rate ups to 75% firms can also invest on region D and if
it goes to 95% firms can also invest on region E, but we know that they will invest only when
the present value of the pre-taxes profit flows reaches the trigger value. However, to invest on
region F firms will need a subsidy rate higher than 95%. This means that the Government can
increase the regions of the private investment by reducing tax rate or increasing subsidy.
In this analysis we try to understand the different types of private investment, seeing how
the trigger value varies, for each type, with interest rate changes. Keeping the present value of
the profit flows Vp = 200, the investment will be implemented now only if the trigger value do
not exceed the Vp which means in the regions below or equal to the line (VCrit = 200).
With these parameters, with a tax rate of 25% and a subsidy of 0 (inferior limit of region
A), firms will only invest if the interest rate does not exceed 3%. Without tax rate and subsidy
(inferior limit of region B), firms will only invest if the interest rate does not exceed 8%. On
region C, firms will invest until the interest rate equals 15%. On region D there is the possibility
of investing until the interest rate is equal to 25%, but only on region E and F this is always
possible, considering a maximum interest rate of 25%.
Table A.8 in the Appendix shows the conditions for the inferior and superior limits of each
region and also some numerical values for the percentage of subsidy, ψ, and for the capital
income tax rate, tc, which allows the existence of those limits. Choosing one region, on region
C must be a combination of ψ and tc which ensure that (1 − ψ)(1 − tc) is 2/3 for the inferior
limit and 1 for the superior limit. In this case, for example, the percentage of subsidy and the
capital income tax rate could be, respectively, 50% and 25% for the inferior limit, but they have
to be equal on the superior limit.
Table A.8 also shows that increasing the interest rate leads to a high necessity of Govern-
ment intervention to ensure the execution of the investment. This means that the Government
must try all the solutions to keep the interest rate in low levels before subsidizing directly the
investment. Considering the independence of the central bank, if the official interest rate of
the economy is not sufficient, the Government must try some credit lines in good conditions for
important projects. One of the ways, in the European Union, is the financing of the European
Investment Bank. Nevertheless, the Government can create some specific credit lines too. The
importance of this way is to ensure low interest rates for positive projects.
5.3 Subsidy versus volatility
The volatility is another parameter with a large impact on investment decisions. Similarly to
the interest rate, decreasing the volatility to about 16% would allow the implementation of the
investment, in substitution of the subsidy rate of 10%. If we set the tax rate on 25%, the
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volatility must be below 16%. As in the analysis of the interest rate, this means that the part
of region A below Vp∗ = 200 ensures the investment implementation (Figure 6, right panel).
Then, with a decrease of the ratio (1 − ψ)(1 − tc), the region where the investment can be
implemented immediately expands, as in the interest rate example. Table A.9 in the Appendix
shows that an increase on volatility turns the investment more dependent of the Government
support.
If we consider regions bellow F, firms will require more than 100% of the cost of the invest-
ment or, in other way, current transfers for implementing the project. This is a situation of
projects with higher risk and lower or even negative values. Normally, these kinds of projects
are implemented by the Government because the objectives, rather than its profitability, are
other benefits for society.
It is not easy to understand whither the Government can incentive private investment when
the objective is not the profits. Really, in this case the Government must weigh some important
variables as the social welfare.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the interaction between the firms and the Government in the con-
text of investment decisions. Following a real options approach, the firms will only invest when
the present value of the investment reach the trigger value. However, the introduction of the
Government, trough the existence of taxes, increases the trigger value of the investment, so this
difficult the investment implementation. Anyway, in this paper we show that the Government
can promote investment by many ways.
In fact, in this paper we have shown that the Government, even though looking to achieve
their own objectives, can have also a very important role in the promotion of the private invest-
ment, particularly in what matters to their instant execution. Concretely, in the same way of
Pennings (2000), we have shown that firms would like to invest immediately if there is a certain
amount of subsidy which reduces the trigger value of the investment to the present value of the
investment.
We focused on both perspectives, so it is possible to hasten the investment if both conditions
are achieved: if the subsidy is sufficiently high for making firms want to invest and also if it is
sufficiently low to be supported by the Government. Accordingly, if the optimal subsidy for firms
is lower than the maximum one for the public authority. At this point, based on Afonso et al.
(2005) and Chakraborty and Dabla-Norris (2009), we have studied the Government inefficiency
hypothesis, and we have identified a direct relation between the level of inefficiency and the
maximum subsidy that they may sustain. This is because inefficiency decreases their payoffs
and so it makes the subsidy policy more attractive.
When the Government wants to promote economic growth and in the presence of inefficiency,
it may be better to subsidy firms instead of invest by itself. This solution can have a great impact
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on GDP, not only in the short-run because of the investment increasing, but also in the long-
run because the substitution of some inefficient public investment by more productive private
investment makes the economy more efficient and productive and it may results in a high level
of GDP. For this to happen, it is crucial the selection of key sectors and the choice of the
best projects. To keep the efficiency in a high level it is determinative to continue by selecting
the most productive investments. This brings a higher multiplier effect of the investment and
so a higher GDP and high payoffs for the Government. Notwithstanding, it is also crucial the
existence of a basic stock of good public investment, implemented directly by the Government or
indirectly via subsidy. This ensures the existence of suitable conditions for the private investment
implementation.
By exploring the main parameters, we have shown that they have a great impact in invest-
ment decisions. This way, one of the worries of the Government must be to ensure low volatility
and low interest rates, but also to keep the capital income tax rates in low levels. Nevertheless,
we have found no evidence that reducing the tax rate is better than the subsidize policy. This
could be possible for the Government if the reduction was temporary, which have a lower positive
effect in the investment decisions of the private sector.
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